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ARTICLE
SOVEREIGNTY AND THE WORLD ECONOMY
PAUL B. STEPHAN*
Even before COVID-19 struck, we were going through a remarkable
moment of political, economic, and social turmoil. Disruption of many in-
ternational institutions, both formal and informal, and a sea of change in
national politics have taken over the global stage. The United States tried to
renegotiate the terms of its engagement with the rest of the world; the Euro-
pean Union’s structural flaws became manifest, with Brexit possibly only
the first sign of a wider crackup; the domestic politics of many great states
turned towards populism and the obliteration of historically significant po-
litical parties; authoritarianism rose, and liberal democracy waned, in those
parts of the world that had seemed transformed in or around the annus
mirabilis of 1989; and the dark side of technological innovation manifested
itself in the privatization of organized violence, unsustainable inequality,
and the erasure of privacy.1 Then COVID-19 came, with its dire if still not
* John C. Jeffries, Jr., Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Virginia. This article
had a trial run at the University of St. Thomas Law School symposium on Sovereignty in a
Fragmenting, Globalizing World. Appropriately enough for the article’s theme, but sadly none the
less, the symposium moved online in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. I am grateful to the
symposium organizers for inviting me and the participants for their comments and questions, as
well as my colleagues at Virginia who participated in a virtual workshop that produced many
excellent suggestions. Pamela Clark, George Rutherglen, and J. Anderson Thomson read an ear-
lier version of this paper and provided invaluable criticism and suggestions. Marcello Kilani pro-
vided great research assistance. Responsibility for errors and misjudgments belongs to me alone.
1. E.g., HUMAN RIGHTS IN A TIME OF POPULISM: CHALLENGES AND RESPONSES (Gerald L.
Neuman ed., 2020) (surveying worldwide attacks on liberal democratic conception of human
rights); IVAN KRASTEV & STEPHEN HOLMES, THE LIGHT THAT FAILED (2019) (crisis of liberalism);
TIM MAURER, CYBER MERCENARIES – THE STATE, HACKERS, AND POWER (2018) (death of pri-
vacy); CATHY O’NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION: HOW BIG DATA INCREASES INEQUALITY
AND THREATENS DEMOCRACY (2017) (technological innovation and inequality); MICHAEL
O’SULLIVAN, THE LEVELLING: WHAT’S NEXT AFTER GLOBALIZATION (2019) (transformation of
international economics and crisis of inequality); THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY (2013) (also discussing the transformation of international economics and crisis of
inequality); BENJAMIN WITTES & GABRIELLA BLUM, THE FUTURE OF VIOLENCE (2015) (privatiza-
tion of organized violence); SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM (2018)
(death of privacy).
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fully realized consequences. For much of the world, this is a time of
troubles.2
What does this have to do with sovereignty? The present moment in-
vites yet another reconsideration of the nation-state as the nexus of sover-
eignty as well as of the dominance of the liberal-democratic ideal.3 Can we
talk about sovereignty without committing to a political or historical theory
about the inevitability or desirability of particular kinds of social organiza-
tion? Is the liberal democratic nation-state indispensable to a minimally ac-
ceptable social life, and if not, what is?4
This article argues that we cannot begin to make sense of the present
series of crises in contemporary domestic politics and international relations
without accepting the flexibility and contingency of sovereignty. Localities,
substates (States), nation-states, and the international order all may exercise
some form of sovereignty.5 Sovereignty is a relationship, not a fundamental
concept on which to build a general theory of political economy.6 With this
insight, one can begin to account for the present troubles, however incom-
plete that account might be.
My argument is fairly straightforward. First, I lay out the reasons for
divorcing the concept of sovereignty from the modern idea of a nation-state.
Second, I argue that the most significant force driving economic, political,
and social change over the past fifty years is the emergent knowledge econ-
omy. The immediate crisis associated with COVID-19 seems to have ampli-
fied this process, although we won’t know for sure for some time. Third, I
2. In Russian history and culture, the time of troubles refers literally to the disordered pe-
riod between the end of the Rurik dynasty in 1598 and the ascension of the Romanovs in 1613 and
metaphorically to a time of catastrophic social disruption and great suffering, most recently for
most Russians in the 1990s. See ALLEN C. LYNCH, HOW RUSSIA IS NOT RULED: REFLECTIONS ON
RUSSIAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 85–127 (2005).
3. One international law scholar introduced the term “sovereigntist” to disparage those who
were not internationalists. Peter J. Spiro, The New Sovereigntists, FOREIGN AFF., at 9, Nov.–Dec.
2000. At least for that writer, sovereignty equates with nationalism and should be contrasted with
the historically inevitable triumph of international governance and cosmopolitanism. See generally
Peter J. Spiro, Sovereigntism’s Twilight, 31 BERK. J. INT’L L. 307 (2013). This article demon-
strates the invalidity of the equation that serves as that writer’s premise, although it also casts
doubt on his conclusion. There is no necessary connection between the Westphalian conception of
state sovereignty and the supposed inevitability of the liberal-democratic ideal, although some
bundle them together. See, e.g., FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN
(1992) (inevitability of liberal democracy); MICHAEL MCFAUL, ADVANCING DEMOCRACY ABROAD
(2009) (centrality of liberal democracy as an object of international relations).
4. I had nearly completed this article before the publication of DON HERZOG, SOVEREIGNTY,
RIP (2020). Our views on the meaning of sovereignty are, although not identical, largely congru-
ent. One wishing to explore the topic further should refer to this erudite and brilliant book.
5. I follow here the convention of capitalizing the word “State” when referring to one or
more of the States of the United States. I use the word “state” to refer to nation-states as well as
the abstract concept of a state.
6. For those open to economic theory, one might compare sovereignty to a relational con-
tract. See ROBERT E. SCOTT & PAUL B. STEPHAN, THE LIMITS OF LEVIATHAN: CONTRACT THEORY
AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 65–70 (2006).
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sketch out the effects of that economy on different sites of sovereignty:
local, substate, national, and international. These effects, I argue, create
both synergies and antagonisms that play out differently at each level. I
focus particularly on the waning of international sovereignty as an outcome
of these forces. Finally, I speculate about different scenarios that might re-
sult from the inherent tensions within and among these sites of sovereignty.
I. RETHINKING SOVEREIGNTY
The present series of crises refutes the notion that sovereignty is about
the nation-state. Indeed, tying sovereignty to that particular political institu-
tion seems ahistorical as well as obtuse. Understood functionally, sover-
eignty describes a relationship between recognized authority and those
subject to that authority. For most of recorded history, most people have
lived within political and legal structures where nation-states either did not
provide a nexus of authority at all or shared authority with structures either
below, above, or alongside. Locating an ultimate authority in the nation-
state is very much an artifact of the modern era.7
Past governance did without the nation-state not because, as Hegel and
some of his modern followers have maintained, humanity was benighted
until the nation-state revealed itself as the foundation of an ideal system of
social ordering.8 Rather, no universal ideal exists. Social institutions—gov-
ernance structures included—vary with technological capacities, economic
and social conditions, and exogenous challenges such as disease and cli-
mate change. We should see sovereignty not as a value but a relationship,
one that adapts to circumstances. Today the Hegelian theory that depicts the
nation-state as the primary agent of historical progress, even as the fulfil-
ment of human destiny, seems quaintly irrelevant to contemporary political,
economic, and social issues.
To redeem sovereignty as a useful analytical category, I conceive of it
as a social institution that connects the exercise of authority to the accept-
ance of that authority. A sovereign issues commands that its subjects ac-
cept. Conventional accounts of nation-state sovereignty bolster their
analysis by positing that states have a monopoly over the legitimate use of
force as a means of social control.9 But this claim is definitional, not obser-
7. See Quentin Skinner, A Genealogy of the Modern State, 162 PROC. BRIT. ACAD. 325
(2009) (discussing origins of the idea of the state as a focus of sovereignty). I am indebted to Don
Herzog for the reference.
8. See FUKUYAMA, supra note 3 (using Hegelian theory to argue that triumph of the idea of R
a liberal democratic nation-state in 1989 brought about the end of history).
9. E.g., Max Weber, Politics as Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 136
(H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills trans. & eds., 2013) (“Today, however, we have to say that a state
is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical
force within a given territory. Note that ‘territory’ is one of the characteristics of the state. Specifi-
cally, at the present time, the right to use physical force is ascribed to other institutions or to
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vational, and largely belied by history. Moreover, an emphasis on force
misses the point.
Because threats of violence are costly, and for the most part those costs
grow with scale as well as over time, acceptance of authority tends to rest
on other qualities attached to sovereigns. We might lump these qualities
together into a loose category called legitimacy. To be clear, legitimacy
does not define authority, but it does complement sovereignty in the sense
that it lowers the costs of exercising authority (making law). If we consider
sovereignty from the perspective of functionality rather than of moral the-
ory, we may regard legitimacy as whatever works to encourage the accept-
ance of commands by subjects, with the understanding that different
qualities will work better or worse as conditions vary.10 Sovereignty, then,
consists of a sustained capacity to make commands (law) that some others
(subjects) will obey due to some mixture of force and legitimacy.
An implication of this functional conception of sovereignty is the pos-
sibility of nonexclusivity. Rather than having simple one-on-one relation-
ships, sovereigns and their subjects can form dense networks based on
multiple allocations of sovereignty.11 Sovereignty has a determined scope,
rather than an absolute reign. In private life, a person may honor the edicts
of his or her lawyer and doctor, but that person has a clear understanding of
which commands fall within the issuer’s domain and which can be ignored.
In public life, the same holds true.
Thus it becomes easier to understand sovereignty not as a hierarchy
with an ultimate sovereign always on top, but rather as a set of contracts (in
the notional sense used by political theorists from Plato to Rousseau).12
Multiple sovereigns negotiate the boundaries of their sovereignty—their do-
mains as it were—as set by space (e.g., territory), time (e.g., moment of
establishment of the sovereign), and subject matter (e.g., interstate versus
intrastate commerce). These negotiations produce allocations of effective
individuals only to the extent to which the state permits it. The state is considered the sole source
of the ‘right’ to use violence.”).
In light of the COVID-19 scourge, it is poignant, even if beside the point of this article, that
not many months after delivering the lecture on which this essay was based, Weber succumbed to
the Spanish Influenza pandemic.
For evidence that the development of the concept of sovereignty in the early modern period
was, among other things, a reaction to the absence of a state monopoly over the legitimate use of
force, see HERZOG, supra note 4, at 41–47. R
10. Cf. Paul B. Stephan, The Legitimacy of International Law, in PALGRAVE HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL THEORY (Howard Williams, David Boucher, Peter Sutch & David A.
Reidy eds., forthcoming 2021) (discussing functional approaches to legitimacy).
11. This concept corresponds to Elinor Ostrom’s model of polycentric governance. Elinor
Ostrom, Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems, 100
AM. ECON. REV. 641 (2010) (Nobel Prize lecture).
12. See Paul B. Stephan, Courts-on-Courts: Contracting for Engagement and Indifference in
International Judicial Encounters, 100 VA. L. REV. 17, 39–40 (2014) (using contract as metaphor
in political theory).
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authority, which may be stable or dynamic.13 As a result of these alloca-
tions, different sovereigns operate on different scales, from the international
(which should not be confused with the universal) down to the basic social
unit (family or clan, whatever happens to fill that role at a particular place
and time).14
As a logical matter, one need not confine this conception of sover-
eignty to public bodies. Private groups can exercise systematic power, for
example by forming clubs (in the economic sense) that deliver rules as part
of the goods it provides members.15 For purposes of simplicity, however,
this article limits its scope to authoritative acts undertaken by public bodies,
even if procured by private interests. As long as the focus remains on do-
mestic politics and their impact on international sovereignty, nothing essen-
tial is lost.16
One could take a deep dive into history to substantiate and validate this
understanding of sovereignty. My interest, however, is not in unpacking all
the implications of a pluralistic conception of sovereignty, but rather in its
present usefulness. This article focuses on the current disorder in the con-
temporary world. We have come to the end of the brief reign of liberal
internationalism and the undoing of the supposed end of history. Recogniz-
ing that sovereignty operates severally, rather than singly, can help us to
understand what has happened and what may await us.
In particular, this understanding of sovereignty advances an analysis of
the current crisis in international law. As an occasional practitioner of inter-
national law, I am interested in the surprisingly difficult question of
whether one can attribute sovereignty to international law. The question is
difficult because no consensus exists about the sources of international law
and which institutions act as international lawgivers. We cannot anthropo-
morphize international law the way we can tie the sovereignty of the Ro-
man Catholic Church to the pope or that of the United States to the
13. See Paul B. Stephan, Competing Sovereignty and Laws’ Domains, 45 PEPP. L. REV. 239,
250–55 (2018) (addressing the process of domain allocation).
14. There is irony, but perhaps aptness as well, in the senior Oliver Wendell Holmes’s self-
description in the title of his famous collection. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE AUTOCRAT OF
THE BREAKFAST TABLE (1858). Herzog concedes the coherence of this conception of sovereignty
but disparages it as weird; he would prefer to abandon the term “sovereignty” altogether. DON
HERZOG, supra note 4, at xii. He would instead employ the concepts of state, jurisdiction, and R
authority, which in his view avoid what he regards as the ineluctable problem of attributing to
sovereignty a nature as either unlimited, undivided, or unaccountable. Id. at 290.
15. A rich literature addresses this problem. See, e.g., Kristen Eichensehr, Digital Switzer-
lands, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 665 (2019). I have considered it as well. Paul B. Stephan, Privatizing
International Law, 97 VA. L. REV. 1573, 1596–97 (2011); Paul B. Stephan, The Futility of Unifi-
cation and Harmonization in International Commercial Law, 39 VA. J. INT’L L. 743 (1999) (dis-
cussing political economy of private international lawmakers).
16. Cf. JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET? ILLUSIONS OF A
BORDERLESS WORLD 65–85 (2006) (describing “How Governments Rule the Net” in spite of
claims about the erasure of states in cyberspace).
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president and Congress. How can there be an authoritative command-giver
(lawmaker) if we can’t say who it is?17
Yet there seems a clear link between technological changes that in-
crease the value of transborder human interactions (commercial and other-
wise), the accretion of customs and the emergence of international
institutions and instruments that provide order and stability to these interac-
tions, and the claim that international law is something to be reckoned with.
If we can agree that international law does some work in the contemporary
world, even if we cannot agree about the specifics of that work or on an
account as to why it works, then we must accept that there is some social
practice that produces a set of commands to which some people in some
instances believe they are subject.18 There is, in other words, a kind of in-
ternational-law sovereign, even if it doesn’t look like an ancient prince,
king, prelate, or emperor, much less the kinds of nation-state sovereigns
that rose to power and influence in modern times.19
If one accepts that international law reflects a kind of sovereignty, it
becomes easier to look into the causes of the current decline in international
law’s authority. A significant part of the general political upheaval in to-
day’s world entails important actors turning their back on international in-
stitutions that emerged in the years following World War II and expanded
significantly after the collapse of the Soviet Union.20 As the next section
demonstrates, the waning of international law reflects the same forces that
have upended politics and social solidarity within so many nation-states.
II. THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE
WORLD
To understand what has changed broadly in the world, one should start
with the postindustrial transformation of the world economy. Technological
innovation and the growing role of knowledge in economic relations have
had significant political and social consequences. In this section, I provide a
brief sketch of the transformation and its effects.
17. Cf. Ryan Martinez Mitchell, International Law as Project or System?, 51 GEO. J. INT’L
L. 623, 686–89 (2020) (exploring problem of authorship in international law).
18. Cf. LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE 47 (2d ed. 1979) (“Almost all nations observe
almost all principles of international law and almost all of their obligations almost all of the
time.”). Henkin overstated his claim, in part by ignoring the difference between convenience and
compulsion. Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, Understanding the Resemblance Between Mod-
ern and Traditional Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 639, 654–61, 672 (2000).
The statement in text expresses a more defensible claim about international law’s capacity to
induce (rather than only reflect) behavior.
19. See Stephan, supra note 13, at 249–50, 255–58 (discussing domain of international law).
20. See generally Paul B. Stephan, The New International Law — Legitimacy, Accountabil-
ity, Authority, and Freedom in the New Global Order, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1555 (1999) (describ-
ing expansion of international institutions in the 1990s).
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What do we mean by the knowledge economy?21 Does it even make
sense to talk about a political economy of the production of knowledge?
These questions seem fundamental to any appreciation of the contemporary
world, even if many great thinkers have ducked them. Bertrand Russell fa-
mously claimed, “Work is of two kinds: first, altering the position of matter
at or near the earth’s surface relatively to other such matter; second, telling
other people to do so.”22 Russell largely deprecated people who fell into the
second class, regarding their position as an artificial product of arbitrary
social relations, rather than as connected to the accumulation of valuable
human and social capital.23 In this respect his view aligned with that of
Marx and Engels, who treated technological innovation, although funda-
mental to the development of society and history, as an exogenous force.24
What this perspective misses is the reality that technological innova-
tion not only shapes, but is shaped by, social structures.25 Innovation is a
dynamic trial-and-error process, with the effectiveness of steps that build on
trials depending heavily on the quality of information about the trials’ re-
sults. The quality of information turns on the level of investment made to
acquire it. How much one invests in acquiring information further depends
on that investment’s return. Structures that link investment return to suc-
cessful uses of the knowledge gained likely lead to better investment deci-
sions than those that do not. The rather messy natural experiment that the
21. For one useful definition, consider Professor Unger’s: “At first approximation the knowl-
edge economy is the accumulation of capital, technology, technology-relevant capabilities, and
science in the conduct of productive activities.” ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, THE KNOWLEDGE
ECONOMY 20 (2019). This inclusive conception seems right even if one does not accept the imagi-
native, indeed utopian, program that Unger proceeds to propose in this work.
22. Bertrand Russell, In Praise of Idleness, HARPER’S MAG., Oct. 1932, https://harpers.org/
archive/1932/10/in-praise-of-idleness.
23. See ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN
COMMUNITY (2000) (describing the concept of social capital); Paul B. Stephan III, Federal Income
Taxation and Human Capital, 70 VA. L. REV. 1357, 1358–60 (1984) (summarizing theory of
human capital).
24. To be fair, Marx is far from clear. From the perspective of production, he refers to a
“revolution” in the means or method of production but seems to view this innovation as “sponta-
neous” to the system of production itself, and moreover in opposition to the basic thesis of dialec-
tical materialism. See, e.g., KARL MARX, CAPITAL: CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, VOL. 1, at
411, 431, 438, 504 (Ben Bowkes trans., 1990). At times, however, he posits that practical produc-
tion problems direct mathematical and natural scientific research, but, quite uncharacteristically,
provides no factual or historical evidence. Id. at 436, 508, 616–17. Accordingly, his concrete
analyses treat technological innovation as essentially independent of the system of production. So,
it seems, does Unger. UNGER, supra note 21, at 42 (describing technological innovation in terms R
of cognitive psychology).
25. See Dani Rodrik, Technology for All, PROJECT SYNDICATE (Mar. 6, 2020), https://
www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/shaping-technological-innovation-to-serve-society-by-
dani-rodrik-2020-03 (“The blind spot is the product of a certain kind of technological fetishism
that views innovation as an exogenous force behaving according to its own rules. We tend to think
we have little control over innovation. It is society that must adjust to technological change, in-
stead of vice versa.”); see also UNGER, supra note 21, at 227–33 (regarding as imperative a “struc- R
tural vision” that will lead to the creation of an inclusive reimagination of the knowledge
economy).
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world ran between 1928 (the beginning of the first Five Year Plan in the
USSR) and 1987 (the first steps toward privatization in the same place)
suggests rather strongly, although not definitively, that placing innovation
under exclusive state-bureaucratic control stunts innovation relative to some
mix of government and market management.26 The present natural experi-
ment entailed in the various responses to COVID-19 scourge at all levels of
sovereignty further reminds us both how information-dependent effective
management of a catastrophe is and how easy it is to drown valuable infor-
mation in a sea of noise.
One need not believe that a simple linear relationship exists between
incentive to invest and the production of useful knowledge to appreciate
that incentives matter. Economists and specialists in the law of intellectual
property are deeply divided over what mix of private- and public-law rules
might best generate and disseminate useful knowledge.27 The point is that
only the complete exclusion of private incentives has a clear track record of
suppressing innovation.
Another theoretical claim that our experience over the last fifty years
seems to have validated is that knowledge, treated as an input in economic
activity, has positive returns to scale.28 Knowledge is costly to acquire, but
not so expensive to reproduce. If one obtains valuable knowledge (under-
standing value as something that can be used in profitable activity, however
a society defines profit), applying that knowledge across a broader market
generates larger returns without correspondingly increased costs. One strat-
egy to grow the size of markets is to roll back limits on transnational activi-
ties, both trade and investment. Without getting into the causation issue,
one can confidently say that more globalization increases the value of
knowledge, all other things being equal.
A glance around the world confirms this insight. Revolutions in com-
munication and information management have created new technology sec-
tors around the planet. We see this not only in the information-aggregation
service companies such as Alibaba, Alphabet, Amazon, Facebook,
Microsoft, and Tencent, but in biotechnology and a wide range of hardware
companies, including those doing aerospace and defense. Knowledge-based
technologies over the past few decades have transformed the shipping in-
dustry, one of the most ancient and commercially significant of human so-
cial practices. Indirect evidence of the importance of knowledge in the
world economy is the growing cost of acquiring it, as reflecting in rising
26. See generally John H. Moore, Agency Costs, Technological Change, and Soviet Central
Planning, 24 J.L. & ECON. 189 (1981).
27. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER JON SPRIGMAN & KAL RAUSTIALA, THE KNOCK-OFF ECONOMY:
HOW IMITATION SPARKS INNOVATION (2012) (arguing against simple property-right model but
accepting importance of incentives). Unger would see the tradeoff as a false choice that hides the
need for a wholesale reimagination of methods of production. UNGER, supra note 21, at 129–35. R
28. Paul M. Romer, Increasing Returns and Long-Term Growth, 94 J. POL. ECON. 1002
(1986) (paper contributed to Romer’s Nobel in 2018).
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tuition charges among the great international universities (and an emerging
innovation lag in countries that restrict such rises).
None of this is novel. What adds political salience to these develop-
ments, however, is the observation that innovation has a geographic dimen-
sion. Knowledge transmission seems to benefit from physical proximity
among knowledge workers. In spite of the revolution in remote access over
the last forty years, knowledge seems to grow best where innovators have
intensive personal contacts with each other.29 Accordingly, the knowledge
economy is also largely an urban-cluster economy.
Clustering implies labor mobility. Artificial distinctions such as na-
tionality, race, gender, and the like have little if anything to do with a per-
son’s value within the knowledge economy. Accordingly, maximizing the
gains from knowledge clusters mandates razing barriers based on anything
other than one’s knowledge (understood as qualities valued by the knowl-
edge economy). Cosmopolitanism thus seems a natural accompaniment to
these new trends in the global economy. The great global cities have be-
come empires of talent, rather than homelands based on blood and soil.30
Were this the whole picture, the knowledge economy would seem an
unmitigated blessing for humanity. But it’s not. Sociologists more than
economists have uncovered a dark side to urban clusters in the knowledge
economy.31 If increasing returns to knowledge (human capital) represents a
demand-side story, then there is a parallel supply-side story about people
with low levels of human capital. Knowledge workers are specialized,
which means that they need others to provide services for their sustenance.
Knowledge workers, like most people, prefer to obtain these services at low
prices. Price-reducing competition thrives when nationality-based barriers
fall, allowing low-human-capital service workers (nannies, cleaners, cab
drivers, restaurant workers, etc.) from around the world to come to the
global cities.
Knowledge workers have both the incentive and the power to appro-
priate a portion of the gains service workers obtain through their migration.
Accordingly, knowledge workers surround themselves with low-skill ser-
vice providers who find it easy to come to the new urban empires but face a
29. See Paul Krugman, Increasing Returns and Economic Geography, 99 J. POL. ECON. 483
(1991) (paper contributed to Krugman’s Nobel in 2008). For legal research pointing in the same
direction, see Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts:
Silicon Value, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575 (1999).
30. Paul B. Stephan, Foreign Relations and the City, in CITIES, GEOPOLITICS, AND THE INTER-
NATIONAL LEGAL ORDER – REPORT AND THOUGHT PIECES 1 (2019), https://drive.google.com/file/
d/1yiRKfTmWZWSRVzoHRHLE—G16ROYTGxU/view. See also EDWARD GLAESER, TRIUMPH
OF THE CITY (2011).
31. Especially prominent is the work of Saskia Sassen. See, e.g., SASKIA SASSEN, THE MO-
BILITY OF CAPITAL AND LABOR: A STUDY IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AND LABOR FLOW
(1988); LOSING CONTROL? SOVEREIGNTY IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION (1996); SASKIA SASSEN,
GUESTS AND ALIENS (2000); SASKIA SASSEN, TERRITORY, AUTHORITY, RIGHTS: FROM MEDIEVAL
TO GLOBAL ASSEMBLAGES (2006).
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risk of expulsion. Low human capital means it’s easy to switch out incum-
bents with newcomers, which makes knowledge workers indifferent to the
service providers’ insecurity. Implicit competition between incumbent ser-
vice workers and their potential replacements lowers the cost to knowledge
workers of employing them. As long as a sufficient number of service
workers prefer insecure opportunities in urban clusters to a securely impov-
erished life back home, they will still come.32 We observe this migration
pattern today not just in the great global cities of the rich world, such as
New York, London, San Jose, Singapore, and Tokyo, but also Bangalore,
Mumbai, the Pearl River Delta, and Shanghai, all of which use restrictions
(legal or otherwise) on residence status to lower the wages of low-human-
capital internal migrants.
In one sense we have a win-win situation: migrants still can improve
their lot and send remittances to their families, while knowledge workers
can have their needs met at a lower cost. In another sense, however, the
relationship between these groups presents a serious social problem. Low-
human-capital migrants may be better off because of their move, but that
doesn’t mean that their portion of the gains generated by the knowledge
economy is sustainable. Great inequality shapes their relations with knowl-
edge workers, social and political as well as economic.33 Most recently,
they have borne a disproportionate share of the burden of the COVID-19
pandemic. Over the long term, this imbalance undermines social cohesion,
trust, and ultimately the value of social capital.
Yet inequality is an inevitable byproduct of the knowledge economy.
Its scaling capacity, absent social intervention, skews returns toward top
producers.34 As a result, increased inequality is a negative externality of the
growth of knowledge-based production. Rectifying this inequality may not
be impossible, but it is costly and especially difficult in a time of political
conflict and declining social capital.
To summarize: the most significant global development of the last fifty
years is the rise of the knowledge economy. This rise both reflects and
promotes changes in the mode of production, especially efficiencies in the
productive use of knowledge through clustering of knowledge workers.
These changes have driven the rise of global cities that bring together a new
32. Unlike the enslaved people that fueled the first wave of Western globalization in the
seventeenth and eighteenth century, these immigrants have a kind of choice. Cf. PETER
FRANKOPAN, THE SILK ROADS: A NEW HISTORY OF THE WORLD 241–42, 262–69 (2015) (discuss-
ing role of slave trade in the rise of East India Company, in particular in making the fortune of
Elihu Yale).
33. See, e.g., PIKETTY, supra note 1 (documenting rise of inequality), as well as Saskia Sas- R
sen’s research on inequality in global cities, supra note 31. R
34. For the underlying theory, see Sherwin Rosen, The Economics of Superstars, 71 AM.
ECON. REV. 845 (1981). For evidence confirming the theory, see ALAN B. KRUEGER, ROCKO-
NOMICS: A BACKSTAGE TOUR OF WHAT THE MUSIC INDUSTRY CAN TEACH US ABOUT ECONOMICS
AND LIFE 78–105 (2019).
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über class of skilled, creative, highly compensated workers, characterized
by high human capital, alongside an unter class that provides low skilled
but essential services, characterized by the easy interchangeability and
hence great vulnerability of the class members.35 The cities have been
transformed, with both wealth and inequality increasing along many
dimensions.
One last part of the story remains to be told. The knowledge economy
has displaced other modes of production in the rich world. Many people
who have labored in the displaced sectors fall outside both the über and
unter classes. They can be found wherever manufacturing has declined, in
the United States and Western Europe especially but also in those parts of
the former socialist world where the collapse of the old system left large
portions of the population bereft and unable to benefit from a new emigra-
tion-based remittance economy.36 These dispossessed workers and their
families face barriers to acquiring the talents that the knowledge economy
rewards, but have developed habits of consumption that make it hard to
accept the sub-competitive returns that prevail in the new urban low-
human-capital service sectors.37 These people also have relatively low labor
mobility. They find it hard to pick up stakes relative to the knowledge
workers and service providers that migrate to the new global cities.38
Why these workers face obstacles to upgrading their human capital
and have low labor mobility are difficult questions with widely divergent
answers. For purposes of this paper, it suffices to assert that these condi-
tions exist, that the people affected are driven away from urban concentra-
tions due to the growing cost of living in those areas, and that those people
are sufficiently numerous to have political salience in spaces where they
35. I use the term “class” here in a colloquial sense, and do not mean to endorse the Marxist
conception of class as, from a Hegelian perspective, a fundamental engine of historical develop-
ment. One can identify a class as comprising elements with specified common characteristics
without plugging that class into a particular theory of history. Cf. text accompanying supra note 8 R
(expressing dissatisfaction with Hegelian theory of history because of its nonfalsifiability).
36. Examples include the former German Democratic Republic as well as people in the
United Kingdom north and east of London. Thanks to the ravages of the Great Leap Forward and
the Cultural Revolution, China largely lacked such a class at the time of the Teng Hsiao-Ping
reforms. It was exactly this group that in Russia suffered a shocking decline in life expectancy
during the 1990s and in the twentieth century provides a pillar of support to Vladimir Putin.
LYNCH, supra note 2, at 107. R
37. To be clear, people who fall into this class are not necessarily dispossessed of concrete
property rights. Rather, changes in the demand for their skills relative to their supply due to
structural economic changes have impaired the value of their human capital.
38. See Tadeusz M. Rybczynski, Factor Endowment and Relative Commodity Prices, 22
ECONOMICA 336 (1955) (developing analytics of unbalanced growth due to diversion of inputs
from incumbent sectors to new prospering sectors). The Rybczynski Theorem (more commonly
known today as Dutch Disease, perhaps because of difficulties with Polish names) does not pro-
vide a definitive explanation for the rise of a dispossessed class in the global economy, in particu-
lar because it concentrates on a single-state economy, but it is a good place to start.
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live, which are peripheral to the urban centers.39 It is the emergence of these
dispossessed people as a political force that, it seems, explains much of
contemporary politics around globalization and disruption.40
At a very general level, one can make several observations about the
triangular configuration of conflicts among these classes.41 First, relations
between the über class of knowledge workers and the unter class of low-
human-capital service providers rest on both mutual dependence and stark
contrasts of equality and opportunity. Members of both classes benefit from
the knowledge economy, the über group directly and the unter through seiz-
ing opportunities that would not exist but for the knowledge economy. Yet
the great disparity between the two groups remains and presents a grave
threat to social cohesion, trust, and capital.
The situation seems a natural candidate for redistributive politics. It is
noteworthy, however, that the rich-world political parties most focused on
addressing redistribution between these classes—in particular social demo-
crats in Europe, Labour in the United Kingdom—have faced catastrophic
electoral losses in recent years, leading in France to the complete liquida-
tion of the historic socialist party and only slightly less extreme outcomes in
Greece and Italy. One can wish otherwise, but contemporary politics holds
out little hope for accommodation of these tensions over the short run.42
39. See ANNE CASE & ANGUS DEATON, DEATHS OF DESPAIR AND THE FUTURE OF CAPITAL-
ISM (2020). Deaton won the 2015 Nobel. In that year he and Case published the paper that pro-
vided the impetus for the book. Anne Case & Angus Deaton, Rising Morbidity and Mortality in
Midlife Among White Non-Hispanic Americans in the 21st century, 112 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI.
15078 (2015).
40. For the argument that economic explanations do a better job than cultural ones in ac-
counting for the rise (as opposed to the existence) of national populism around the world, see Dani
Rodrik, Why Does Globalism Fuel Populism? Economics, Culture, and the Rise of Right-Wing
Populism, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 27526, 2020), https://www.nber.org/
system/files/working_papers/w27526/w27526.pdf.
41. I do not claim that across the planet, all workers fall into one of these three categories.
There doubtlessly are people who work outside the knowledge economy who have not faced
immiseration, at least not yet. The argument in text is that, as a generalization, a class of workers
defined by their sense of grievance against the knowledge economy, based upon either an experi-
ence or a threat of lost prestige as well as material well-being, has grown alongside the knowledge
economy and that members of that class increasingly are engaged in struggle against the political,
economic, and social status quo.
It perhaps is worth noting that triangular conflict among distinct classes does not fit naturally
into the principles of dialectical development on which Hegel rested his analysis and which Marx
incorporated into his theory. See text accompanying  supra note 8 (suggesting limitations in Hege-
lian methodology). Cf. A.P. Butenko, 
 [Contradictions in the Development of Socialism as a Social Structure],
 [Questions of Philosophy] 21 (No. 10 1982) (attempting to reconcile
Hegelian dialectic with objective features of Soviet development); Ernst Kux, Contradictions in
Soviet Socialism, 33 PROB. COMMUNISM 1, 15–16 (Nov.–Dec. 1984) (analyzing significance of
Butenko’s work as an implied critique of the dialectic).
42. Economists have suggested one explanation for this difficulty. They offer substantial
empirical evidence for a strong connection (not necessarily causal) between the level of public
support for wealth redistribution and the degree of a country’s cultural (typically ethnic) homoge-
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Second, no political movement on the horizon seems to seek an alli-
ance of the unter class and the dispossessed in opposition to the über class.
People on the left have tried to unite those classes not against knowledge
workers, but instead against plutocrats, hoping that those they seek to rally
will see billionaires as a proxy for the forces that have given rise to their
grievances. One obstacle to forming such an alliance, at least in the rich
world, has been an uncompromising disapproval of the illiberal tendencies
manifested by many members of the dispossessed. National populists, in
contrast, have had considerable success in harnessing the inclination of peo-
ple who fall into the dispossessed class to see the members of both the über
and unter classes as their adversaries. Needless to say, illiberal tendencies
are not a problem for these actors.43
Conflict between the dispossessed, on the one hand, and their per-
ceived antagonists, on the other, has a geographical dimension. The dispos-
sessed tend to live outside the great global cities, but cities and their
peripheries can have other sovereignties in common, in particular substates
or nation-states. Where they share sovereignties, they fight with their class
adversaries. In the next section, I explain how these clashes manifest them-
selves as conflicts over sovereignty.
III. DIFFERENT SOVEREIGNTIES IN THE WORLD: COOPERATION AND
CONFLICT
As explained in this paper’s first section, sovereignty is both multi-
layered and contestable. To simplify, we can talk about the layers as inter-
national, national, subnational (substates of federal states), and local sover-
eignty, although this leaves out a lot of nuance and detail. Conflicts appear
as struggles among these layers over authority to issue commands (make
law) about particular subjects, people, or transactions. One way of linking
the growing knowledge economy, discussed in the second section, to these
conflicts is to show that the economic transformation has led to an increase
in the salience of multiple layers of sovereignty and the intensity of conflict
among them. In this section I use four examples—struggles over the princi-
ple of nondiscrimination based on sexual orientation; the law and policy
governing immigration; the rules for international trade and investment; and
the relationship between general international law and national constitu-
tions—to illuminate inter-sovereignty conflicts.
These examples build on each other. I look first at an issue that seems
divorced from economic interests—the principle of nondiscrimination
based on sexual orientation—and about which international law has little if
neity. ALBERTO ALESINA & EDWARD L. GLAESER, FIGHTING POVERTY IN THE US AND EUROPE: A
WORLD OF DIFFERENCE (2004).
43. See Rodrik, supra note 25 (analyzing response of politicians to globalization shocks);
Dani Rodrik, Populism and the Economics of Globalization, 1 J. INT’L BUS. POL’Y 12–33 (2018).
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anything to say. Next, I look at a debate with significant economic conse-
quences—free migration of labor—that also remains largely unregulated by
international law, and thus does not directly implicate international law’s
sovereignty. Third, I look at an issue that politically is closely tied to the
immigration question—free trade and movement of capital across bor-
ders—where international law purports to have a lot to do. Finally, I review
a longstanding problem in international law that has manifested itself more
frequently lately, namely the power of a state to rely on its domestic consti-
tutional law to avoid its international legal commitments. The progression
of examples shows, for the first two, the intrastate geographical structure of
political conflicts and, for the last two, how these fights, also based on in-
trastate conflicts, affect international law’s sovereign domain.
Consider first how my political-economy analysis maps onto a cul-
tural, largely noneconomic issue, namely opposing discrimination based on
sexual orientation. I do not mean to discount moral defenses of this nondis-
crimination principle, but rather to focus attention on how economic inter-
ests affect how people view these moral claims. Knowledge workers value
legal protection of sexual minorities because, among many other good rea-
sons, discrimination against this group deters talented people from contrib-
uting to knowledge work. In contrast, for those who see themselves as
losers in the new economy, the nondiscrimination principle seems doubly
offensive, putting aside (but not ignoring) bad reasons of bigotry. Not only
does this emerging principle reject tradition as an independent legitimizing
ground (tradition being the refuge of people who have known better times),
but it implies that the suffering and injustice borne by sexual minorities are
greater than those imposed on people whom the knowledge economy has
displaced. In the United States, the urban clusters bolstered by the knowl-
edge economy tend to support the nondiscrimination principle, while subna-
tional units (the States) that encompass those left behind are more likely to
reject it.44
Locating international sovereignty in this controversy is something of
a challenge, given ongoing conflicts over the sources and content of inter-
national law. There is no relevant treaty applicable to the United States, but
only purported customs derived from supposed state practice. Instead, those
who pursue nondiscrimination have had some success in persuading the Su-
preme Court that customary international law supports the principle.45
44. See Richard C. Schragger, Cities as Constitutional Actors: The Case of Same-Sex Mar-
riage, 21 J.L. & POL. 147, 150 (2005) (providing evidence of conflict).
45. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 576–77 (2003) (citing international legal author-
ity); cf. Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1981) (using European Convention on
Human Rights to bar criminal prosecution for homosexual activity); see also Schalk and Kopf v.
Austria, 2010-IV Eur. Ct. H. R. 409 (reversing prior decisions to extend Convention’s principle of
nondiscrimination to family life).
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Others have questioned whether this is true or, even if true, relevant.46 One
can see this debate as not about whether to accept the sovereignty of inter-
national law so much as the instrumental use of international law in contests
between State and local sovereignty, with the national government, the Su-
preme Court excepted, more as a spectator than participant.47
Consider next immigration, an issue that mixes economic interests
with notions of human dignity. Contemporary conflict over immigration has
the same geographical configuration as that over nondiscrimination based
on sexual orientation. In the United States, cities tend to adopt measures to
protect undocumented aliens, while States are more likely to stigmatize
these persons and deny benefits to them.48 The federal government has
switched sides, with the Obama administration’s attack on anti-immigrant
State (rather than local) law giving way to the Trump administration’s ef-
forts to suppress urban resistance to its efforts to deter immigration.49 Inter-
national law comes in at times due to a treaty on obligations owed to
46. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Curtis A. Bradley, The Federal Judi-
cial Power and the International Legal Order, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 59, 92–93 (reviewing debate).
47. See Charlotte Ku, William H. Henning, David P. Stewart & Paul F. Diehl, Even Some
International Law Is Local: Implementation of Treaties Through Subnational Mechanisms, 60 VA.
J. INT’L L. 105, 116–17 (2019) (instances of cities embracing human rights treaties as a means of
pushing against gaps in State or federal law); cf. Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Hum.
Serv., 682 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012) (upholding State authority and invalidating as ultra vires federal
statute requiring discrimination). The Supreme Court’s last word on marriage equality focused
more on the Court’s understanding of its particular role in vindicating individual rights and dis-
cerning community values. United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013) (invalidating Defense
of Marriage Act on due process grounds). Its most recent ruling interpreted existing legislation
regulating workplace discrimination as incorporating a comprehensive nondiscrimination princi-
ple with respect to sex. Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020). This move treats
adoption of the principle, albeit limited in scope to employment, as an exercise of national
sovereignty.
48. E.g., City of Providence v. Barr, 954 F.3d 23 (1st Cir. 2020) (striking down federal
funding limits on sanctuary cities); New York v. U.S. Dep’t. of Just., 951 F.3d 84 (2d Cir. 2020)
(upholding federal limits on grants to sanctuary cities); City of Los Angeles v. Barr, 929 F.3d
1163 (9th Cir. 2019) (also upholding federal limits); United States v. California, 921 F.3d 865 (9th
Cir. 2019) (upholding State laws protecting sanctuary cities), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 124 (2020);
City of Chicago v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272 (7th Cir. 2018) (upholding injunction against enforce-
ment of funding limits); City & County of San Francisco v. Trump, 897 F.3d 1225 (9th Cir. 2018)
(also upholding injunction against enforcement of funding limits); cf. Adriana Stephan, The Rise
of the Far Right: A Subregional Analysis of Front National Support in France (2015) (Honors
Thesis, New York University), https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/The-Rise-of-the-Far-
Right-%3A-A-Subregional-Analysis-Stephan/3044c9a523e29e5f95c77a424baa8555711668f3
(observing positive correlation between anti-immigrant politics in France at the department level,
and negative correlation at the ville sublevel).
49. Compare In re United States, 138 S. Ct. 443 (2017) (vacating injunction against termina-
tion of program pending consideration of reviewability under APA), on remand, Regents of the
Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 908 F.3d 476 (9th Cir. 2018) (enjoining change of
policy based on violation of APA and plausible equal protection claim), vacated and remanded,
140 S. Ct. 1891 (2020) (requiring federal government to justify its reversal of prior administra-
tion’s policy under APA but rejecting constitutional claim), with Arizona v. United States, 567
U.S. 387 (2012) (holding State regulation of undocumented immigrants preempted by federal
law).
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refugees, the specifics of which are debated.50 But, as in the sexual-orienta-
tion discrimination conflict, international sovereignty intrudes only at the
margins, if at all.
These examples, one entirely non-economic and the second combining
issues bearing on fundamental human rights with hard-nosed economic con-
flict, frame consideration of a third example: namely, conflicts over interna-
tional trade and investment. As discussed above, because of the benefits to
the knowledge economy from scaling, increased mobility in factors of pro-
duction and products favors that sector. Those who supply inputs to the
knowledge economy, in particular knowledge workers, thus have a strong
incentive to support liberal regimes governing trade and investment. Those
who benefit from the knowledge economy have been mostly strong propo-
nents of such a regime.
Again, those dispossessed by the knowledge economy supply a natural
base for opposition to liberal rules governing international trade and invest-
ment. Largely their views on trade and investment converges with those on
immigration. This opposition does not depend on a clear and direct connec-
tion between free trade and economic displacement. The empirical econom-
ics literature has attempted to distinguish between liberalized international
trade and technological innovations as causes of worker injury, with the
weight of the evidence assigning greater causal force to the latter.51 This
literature overlooks the role that technological innovation plays in increas-
ing the demand for open borders. More to the point, people who have lost
out to the knowledge economy do not require solid empirical evidence to
sustain their grievances. It suffices that they can perceive a connection be-
tween international economic liberalization and their hard times—convinc-
ing proof of causation is unnecessary for carrying a grudge.
Thus, the rise of the knowledge economy has heightened the political
volatility of international economic liberalization. It has increased both the
demand for and strident opposition to lower domestic barriers to trade and
investment. These forces manifest themselves throughout the rich world,
with Brexit and the 2016 US presidential election providing only the most
vivid examples.
Unlike the sexual-orientation nondiscrimination principle and immi-
gration policy, however, international law dominates the world of interna-
tional trade and investment. Significant multilateral, regional, and bilateral
treaties apply, many accompanied by a compulsory dispute settlement appa-
ratus. Investment dispute settlement often includes direct actions by inves-
50. E.g., East Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, 950 F.3d 1242, 1274–77 (9th Cir. 2020)
(discussing UN Convention on Status of Refugees).
51. E.g., David Autor, David Dorn, Lawrence F. Katz, Christina Patterson & John Van
Reenen, The Fall of the Labor Share and the Rise of Superstar Firms, 135 Q. J. ECON. 645 (2020)
(indicating that superstar firms do a better job both of exploiting factor mobility and knowledge
development).
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tors, avoiding state-to-state procedures. Some versions of these treaties have
been around for centuries, but the post-Cold War period that produced a
significant expansion of the knowledge economy also saw a qualitative
transformation of the international trade and investment regime.52
Over the past few years, a broad effort to unwind that expansion has
emerged. The closing down of the Appellate Body, the most court-like
component of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Dispute Settlement
Body (DSB), is the most recent, but not necessarily the most important,
consequence.53 The United Kingdom’s renunciation of the jurisdiction of
the Court of Justice of the European Union, the United States’ walking
away from the Transpacific Partnership and revising the North American
Free Trade Agreement, and the eruption of unilateral trade sanctions by the
United States all are emblematic. European states also have not been shy
about acting unilaterally to attack aspects of international economic rela-
tions that they dislike.54 The present response to the COVID-19 challenge
has accelerated the process of renouncing international economic law as a
constraint on state behavior as new barriers to trade in needed goods pop
up.55
Open rejection of international economic law is one thing. More inter-
esting, however, are efforts by states to exploit gaps and paradoxes in the
existing rules to undermine the structure as a whole. These rules typically
recognize that the bargained-for cooperation and constraint plays out
against a background of uncertainty about the future. Accordingly, they
leave states some leeway to opt out of commitments in the face of unex-
pected future conditions. These safety valves, however essential, create op-
portunities for structural challenges to international sovereignty. Subversion
rather than confrontation becomes the means of shrinking the domain of
international law.
A good example of this subversion is the use of a national security
defense to claims of international trade law violations. Such a defense indis-
putably exists under WTO law, but a sharp debate has arisen over how it
works. In essence, the controversy pits two profoundly different visions of
52. See Stephan, supra note 13.
53. The closing down resulted from the refusal of the United States, starting in 2017, to agree
to the appointment of new members of the Appellate Body, coupled with term-limits to incum-
bency that resulted in the Body’s loss of a quorum. As early as the Clinton Administration, the
United States had taken a similar approach to state-to-state dispute settlement under Chapter XX
of the North American Free Trade Agreement. It refused to agree to a list of candidates to serve as
chairs to dispute settlement panels, thus making panel formation impossible. Simon Lester Inu
Manak & Andrej Arpas, Access to Trade Justice: Fixing NAFTA’s Flawed State-to-State Dispute
Settlement Process, 18 WORLD TRADE REV. 63, 66–69 (2019) (describing process).
54. See Ruth Mason, The Transformation of International Tax, 114 AM. J. INT’L L. 353, 386
(2020) (discussing the use of digital taxes to target U.S. technology firms); see generally Lilian V.
Faulhaber, Taxing Tech: The Future of Digital Taxation, 39 VA. TAX REV. 145 (2019).
55. See WTO and IMF Joint Statement on Trade and the COVID-19 Response, WTO (Apr.
24, 2020), https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news20_e/igo_15apr20_e.pdf (deploring barriers).
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the WTO legal regime against each other. On one side, powerful states as-
sert that they retain a general option to call off their legal obligations while
remaining within the system. On the other side, international trade special-
ists argue that such a broad option cannot exist, because if it did the entire
principle of rules-based management of international trade would collapse.
The devil, as always, is in the details. Article XXI(b) of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the international treaty that func-
tions as a kind of constitution of international trade law, allows any state to
disregard its obligations under the GATT system when:
taking any action which it considers necessary for the protection
of its essential security interests . . . (ii) relating to the traffic in
arms, ammunition and implements of war and to such traffic in
other goods and materials as is carried on directly or indirectly for
the purpose of supplying a military establishment; (iii) taken in
time of war or other emergency in international relations . . . .56
The question that jumps out is the scope of the “it considers” modifier.
What room does this language leave for adjudication of disputes by the
WTO DSB, a system of state-to-state adjudication established in the 1994
Uruguay Round Agreements?57
At least three plausible interpretations present themselves. First, the
DSB might address only the question whether a state does “consider” the
otherwise unlawful measure necessary for its national security interests.
Second, the Body might also decide whether, as an objective matter, the
measure is connected in some way to military procurement, as determined
by the DSB, or is taken in the context of an emergency in international
relations, also as determined by the Body. Third, the Body might consider
whether a state’s claim as to what measures it considers necessary is made
in good faith, taking into account the Body’s independent assessment of
necessity with respect to either procurement or a crisis.58
56. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. XXI(b), Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 194,
266 (emphasis added). An identical provision, Article 73(b) of the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement], governs disputes over
enforcement of intellectual property rights.
57. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S.
401 [hereinafter Understanding on Dispute Settlement].
58. The two published cases from the WTO DSB seems to have come close to the last posi-
tion. Panel Report, Russia-Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit, ¶ 7.132, WTO Doc. WT/
DS512/R (adopted Apr. 26, 2019) (applying GATT); Panel Report, Saudi Arabia–Measures Con-
cerning the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights, ¶ 7.250, WTO Doc. WT/DS567/R (adopted
Jun. 16, 2020) (applying TRIPS Agreement). On reading a good-faith requirement into essential-
security provisions in treaties generally, see William W. Burke-White & Andreas von Staden,
Investment Protection in Extraordinary Times: The Interpretation and Application of Non-Pre-
cluded Measures Provisions in Bilateral Investment Treaties, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 307, 376–81
(2008) (arguing for implicit good-faith limitation on self-judging national security clauses in in-
vestment treaties).
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These three approaches represent points along a continuum running
from easy invocation, meaning effortless unilateral avoidance of WTO obli-
gations, all the way to rigorous scrutiny of a state’s motivations and the real
basis of its concerns, meaning third-party oversight having a dominant role
in a wide range of trade disputes. A prior issue, however, is whether the “it
considers” language permits any third-party review. A state might plausibly
argue that when it invokes its essential security interests, all WTO supervi-
sory jurisdiction disappears. Efforts by the DSB to argue otherwise then
must be considered illegitimate. In technical language, one can argue that
the “it considers” language denies the DSB the capacity definitively and
authoritatively to determine its jurisdiction, what in Europe is known as
kompetenz kompetenz.59
If this is correct, or more precisely if enough powerful states assert it is
correct, the WTO Agreements have a problem. Without third-party enforce-
ment, the WTO rules don’t function as law so much as desiderata. Compli-
ance with these rules seem to drop out of the system. Instead, more general
and hard-to-pin-down qualities such as a state’s tendency toward coopera-
tiveness or disruption do all the work. Robust resort to a national-security
exception, when this choice easily and perhaps automatically ousts formal
dispute settlement, seems to nullify the GATT as a rules-based system that
constrains states in the pursuit of a greater good.60
For the first twenty years of the WTO, no one sought to test the dispute
settlement system by invoking Article XXI(b). Commentators have sug-
gested that the logic of mutually assured destruction applied. The risk of
creating an easy out from formal dispute settlement, and thus undermining
the WTO Agreements as a legal system, deterred states from opening up the
national security Pandora’s box.61 In the closing years of the 2010s, how-
ever, three states, in particular the heavyweight United States, defended
their actions under that Article.62 Two WTO panels have protected the
DSB’s jurisdiction against the kompetenz kompetenz argument, but the shut-
59. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE U.S. LAW OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL AND
INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION § 2.8 cmt. a (Prop. Final Draft, Apr. 24, 2019) (kompetenz
kompetenz in arbitration); J.H.H. Weiler & Ulrich R. Haltern, The Autonomy of the Community
Legal Order—Through the Looking Glass, 37 HARV. INT’L L. J. 411, 413 (1996) (judicial
kompetenz kompetenz).
60. The point in text is overstated. A significant literature demonstrates how informal rule
enforcement (i.e., taking third party dispute settlement bodies and nonstate rule enforcers out of
the equation) can, in appropriate contexts, work fine. Scott & Stephan, supra note 6, at 84–97,
106–08 (summarizing). The argument is not that the absence of formal enforcement makes law
irrelevant (it doesn’t); rather, this absence allows qualities not captured by legal rules—such as
cooperativeness versus fly-specking, or predictability versus taste for disruption—to become more
salient.
61. Tania Voon, Can International Trade Law Recover? The Security Exception in WTO
Law: Entering a New Era, 113 AM. J. INT’L L. UNBOUND 45, 47–48 (2019).
62. Tania Voon, World Trade Organization — General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
1994 — Security Exception — Freedom of Transit — Russia’s Accession Protocol, 114 AM. J.
INT’L L. 96, 102 (2020).
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ting down of the Appellate Body has undermined the WTO’s ability to take
an authoritative position.63
If significant states, first and foremost the United States, persist in this
approach, the WTO has few weapons it can deploy to defend itself. Hypo-
thetically Europe and China could combine to perpetuate WTO rule en-
forcement.64 Fractures both within Europe and between Europe and China,
however, makes this unlikely as a long-term solution. Maintaining a system
without the United States might not be worth it. A more likely outcome, one
suspects, is surrender on the part of the WTO. One can imagine a new
consensus that retains WTO dispute settlement in some form (perhaps even
with a restoration of a reformed Appellate Body) but with the security ex-
ception of Article XXI(b) allowing any state who wishes to opt out of par-
ticular cases.65
The WTO national-security controversy illustrates this article’s princi-
pal theme, the presence of multiple sovereignties and the fluidity of rela-
tions among the sovereignties that result. During the brief reign of the
liberal-democratic consensus that followed the Cold War, the dream of in-
ternational sovereignty in the greatly expanded global economy seemed
close to reality. Nowhere has the rise of national populism within states,
manifested especially in a growing divide within states between urban
center and periphery, expressed itself more clearly than the assault on lib-
eral governance of international trade and investment.
To summarize, international governance in support of free trade and
international investment reinforces the knowledge economy. Support for
these policies is greatest in urban knowledge centers; opposition is strongest
in peripheral areas where the dispossessed live. The sharpening of these
63. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. A panel or Appellate Body decision does not R
become a binding application of WTO law until a WTO Council adopts it. Each of the various
WTO agreements has its own Council, all typically comprising the same national representatives.
If a party objects to a panel report and the pathway to appeal is blocked due to the inability of the
Appellate Body to function, the best reading of the treaty holds that adoption of the panel report
requires a consensus of the Council, which does not exist if one of the parties disagrees with the
panel. Understanding on Dispute Settlement art. 16(4). Thus, the United States has opposed any
consideration by the DSB of cases that have arisen since the end of the Appellate Body’s quorum.
Statement by the United States, United States-Countervailing Measures on Supercalendered Pa-
per from Canada, WTO Doc. WT/DS505/12 (Apr. 17, 2020), https://geneva.usmission.gov/2020/
03/05/statement-by-the-united-states-at-the-february-28-dsb-meeting-reconvened-on-march-5-
2020.
64. Evidence for China and the European Union working around the United States comes
from the 2020 Multiparty Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement. The arrangement would create
a second level of review of WTO panel decisions, although not a permanent appellate body.
Statement on a Mechanism for Developing, Documenting, and Sharing Practices and Procedures
in the Conduct of WTO Disputes, JOB/DSB/1/Add.12 (Apr. 30, 2020), https://trade.ec.europa.eu/
doclib/docs/2020/april/tradoc_158731.pdf. How this arrangement would mesh with the U.S. posi-
tion noted above, supra note 63, remains to be seen. R
65. This outcome, it must be said, would essentially restore international trade law to where
it stood in 1994, before the Uruguay Round created the new dispute settlement mechanism. The
old system, which allowed a state to reject decisions of arbitration panels, had considerable bite.
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conflicts within states makes it harder to support the domain of international
law in this area. The essential-interests ploy shows how states can slip the
traces of this law, and thus shrink international sovereignty, without for-
mally repudiating the system.
Consider my fourth example of shifts in sovereignty resulting from
municipal (intrastate) conflicts. The “nationalist” part of national populism
seems to entail hostility to all things international, not just regimes that
directly sustain the knowledge economy. In line with this preference, over
the last twelve years states have increasingly exploited a fundamental para-
dox of general international law. According to the traditional and still domi-
nant conception of international law, states alone make international law,
either directly or through their delegates, and must consent to the law
made.66 This premise raises the question of whether states face limits on
what kinds of international law they can make. International lawyers some-
times invoke the idea of preemptory norms (jus cogens) to assert that the
international system itself limits what states can do, implying a kind of hier-
archy in favor of international sovereignty.67 But the reverse also can be
true: municipal (national) law may limit (render ultra vires) some commit-
ments that states might try to make to the international system.68
This possibility, latent in international law and long discussed as a the-
oretical issue, has become state practice in recent years. An early instance
of this trend came within the European Union. The UN Charter has its own
supremacy clause. Article 25 obligates all members to carry out decisions
of the Security Council, and Article 103 states: “In the event of a conflict
between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the
present Charter and their obligations under any other international agree-
ment, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.”69 These
provisions seem to indicate, as clearly as legal language can, that a member
of the UN may not rely on its other international legal obligations to resist
compliance with the Security Council’s mandate. Accordingly, several
states belonging to the European Union adopted measures to implement
Security Council resolutions mandating the freezing of funds of persons
determined by the Council to be supporters of terrorism.
Targets of these measures applied for relief to what was then the Euro-
pean Court of Justice (the Luxembourg Court). That court ruled in 2008 that
66. See Curtis A. Bradley & Judith G. Kelley, The Concept of International Delegation, 71
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (Winter 2008).
67. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331;
Paul B. Stephan, The Political Economy of Jus Cogens, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1073,
1096–101 (2011) (functional analysis of jus cogens concept).
68. This position corresponds closely to what international lawyers considered to be jus
cogens in the years before World War II, namely the minimal requirements of state sovereignty.
Only after the War did international lawyers begin to invoke the jus cogens concept to limit, rather
than to reinforce, state sovereignty. Stephan, supra note 67, at 1081–89.
69. U.N. Charter arts. 25, 103.
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no member of the European Union could comply with the freeze resolutions
unless and until the Security Council provided procedural safeguards to ac-
company its orders.70 Many internationalists supported the decision, partly
because the outcome expanded the rights of persons against governmental
bodies and partly because the Luxembourg itself was a supranational body
thought to be above crass national interests.71 Yet the case opened the door
to other, less cosmopolitan outcomes. These quickly materialized.
Also, in 2008, the Supreme Court of the United States made essentially
the same jurisprudential move as the Luxembourg Court, but not for the
benefit of personal liberty and human rights. It ruled that, as a matter of
constitutional federalism and separation of powers, a State could not be
barred from enforcing a capital sentence that the International Court of Jus-
tice had declared invalid except by a lawful federal mandate to implement
that court’s orders.72 The Court’s refusal to honor an international legal
obligation, resting on structural constitutional law rather than on fundamen-
tal principles of individual rights, illustrated how judicially imposed consti-
tutional resistance could undermine international sovereignty. Judgments to
similar effect by the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom and the Italian
Constitutional Court soon followed.73 Then the Supreme Court of the Rus-
sian Federation ruled that compliance with an order of the European Court
of Human Rights (Strasbourg Court) to compensate a taxpayer for abuses of
tax procedural rules violated the constitutional duty to pay properly as-
sessed taxes.74 Most recently, the German Federal Constitutional Court
70. Case C-402/05, Kadi and Al Barakaat Int’l Found. v. Council and Comm’n, 2008 E.C.R.
I-6351. The Treaty of Lisbon, which went into force on December 1, 2009, changed the court’s
name to the present Court of Justice of the European Union.
71. E.g., ANDRE NOLLKAEMPER, NATIONAL COURTS AND THE INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW
(2011) (defending Luxembourg Court as giving priority to international rule of law over formal
obedience to international treaty obligations); Andre Nollkaemper & Rosanne van Alebeek,
Netherlands, in DUELING FOR SUPREMACY-INTERNATIONAL LAW V. FUNDAMENTAL NATIONAL
PRINCIPLES 255 (Fulvio Maria Palombino ed., 2019) (demonstrating the reconciliation of compet-
ing international obligations within Dutch domestic legal order).
72. Medellı́n v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008). The Court ruled that no treaty joined by the
United States or legislation adopted by Congress provided this mandate, and that the President’s
attempt to order Texas not to carry out the execution exceeded his lawful authority.
73. Corte cost., 22 ottobre 2014, n. 238, Foro it. 2015, I, 1152 (It.), translated in Alessandro
Chechi, Introductory Note to Judgment No. 238-2014 (It. Const. Ct.), 54 Int’l Legal Materials 471
(2015) (parliamentary act implementing decision of International Court of Justice on jurisdictional
immunity of states unconstitutionally violates individual right of access to justice); R (on the
application of Chester) v. Sec’y of State for Just. [2013] UKSC 63 (Act of Parliament required to
implement Strasbourg Court decision on voting rights of prisoners). More recently the Italian
Constitutional Court has expressed a general willingness to reject EU law that transgresses the
Italian Constitution. See Daniele Gallo, Challenging EU Constitutional Law: The Italian Constitu-
tional Court’s new stance on direct effect and the preliminary reference procedure, 25 Eur. L.J.
434 (2019) (describing cases).
74.
[OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v. Russia], Sobranie Zakonodatel’stva Ros-
sii?skoi? Federatsii [SZ RF] [Russian Federation Collection of Legislation] 2017, No. 1-P, Item
180, http://www.ksrf.ru/en/Decision/Judgments/Documents/2017_January_19_1-P.pdf (official
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(Karlsruhe Court) asserted a power it had first indicated it enjoyed back in
1974 to override EU law. It declared invalid as constitutionally ultra vires
implementation within the German legal system of certain decisions of the
European Central Bank that rested on treaty delegations to which Germany
had consented.75
Not all these cases fit into a narrative based on populist politics. First,
the actors are courts, which are presumably less subject to contemporary
political pressure. Second, some of the disputes map onto cultural more
than economic issues. The debate over capital punishment, for example, has
roiled the United States long before the knowledge economy began its pre-
sent rise, as has conflicts over prisoners’ rights in the United Kingdom. But
all the cases reflect a sense that the claims of international sovereignty re-
present not simply an imposition, but an affront to widely shared national
values that international cosmopolitanism had disrespected. Italy’s beef
with the International Court of Justice and the European Union seems preg-
nant with resentment toward Germany, more based on current fights over
austerity than over reparations for World War II; Russia’s decision to defy
the Strasbourg Court complements widespread revulsion against the (non-
ethnically Russian) oligarchs who thrived during the 1990s; and Germany’s
decision reflects anxiety about the European Union undermining German
commitments to fiscal prudence, which in turn rests on a deep historical
phobia regarding hyperinflation. In all these instances, the national court
decisions were consistent with, even if not procured by, deep political tides
pushing back against international sovereignty that present political-eco-
nomic trends have strengthened.
English translation). The obligation of Russia to pay compensation (as distinguished from undoing
its tax measures) as ordered by the Strasbourg Court rested directly on a treaty that it had joined.
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 46(1), Nov. 4,
1950, E.T.S. NO. 5, as amended by Protocol No. 11 to the Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, restructuring the control machinery established
thereby art. 1, May 11, 1994, E.T.S. NO. 155 (entered into force for the Russian Federation on
November 1, 1998). See also Paul B. Stephan, The Future of International Human Rights Law
– Lessons from Russia, 81 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 167, 177 (Winter 2018) (providing context). A
July 2020 amendment to the Russian Constitution expressly ratifies the power of the Constitu-
tional Court to invalidate international legal obligations.
75. Dr. W. v. Germany, BVerfG, [Federal Constitutional Court (second senate)] 2 BvR 859/
15, 1651/15, 2006/15 & 980/16, May 5, 2020, https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/Shared-
Docs/Entscheidungen/EN/2020/05/rs20200505_2bvr085915en.html (ruling that Luxembourg
Court judgment Weiss and others (Case 493/17), 2018 E.C.R. I-1000, violated German Funda-
mental Law). The Karlsruhe Court had first indicated that it would review legal acts of the Euro-
pean Union (then the European Communities) for conformity with Germany’s Fundamental Law
in Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Fut-
termittel, BVerfG [Federal Constitutional (second senate)], 2 BvL 52/71, 37 BVerfGE 271, May
29, 1974,  https://law.utexas.edu/transnational/foreign-law-translations/german/case.php?id=588.
The 2020 decision, however, is the first to apply that power. See John Henry Dingfelder Stone,
Agreeing to Disagree: The Primacy Debate Between the German Federal Constitutional Court
and the European Court of Justice, 25 MINN. J. INT’L L. 127 (2016).
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The point is not that these outcomes are manifestly correct or inevita-
ble. International lawyers like to cite the principle that a state cannot use its
domestic law to avoid an international obligation. Disagreement exists,
however, about the force of the principle and the scope of its exceptions.76
The problem in some sense is baked into any international legal regime.
What is new is not the possibility of these arguments surfacing, but rather
the growing willingness of important states to use the constitutionally ultra
vires argument to walk away from international sovereignty. This trend is
noteworthy in and of itself, regardless of how one regards the quality of the
arguments.
To conclude, all four examples show how changes in the world econ-
omy have political and social repercussions in cities, substates, and nation-
states. These repercussions have undermined willingness to submit to inter-
national sovereignty and fueled contests over which level of municipal sov-
ereignty should reign. As these fights within nation-states have spread,
international sovereignty has receded. In the next section I consider scena-
rios for the unfolding of these conflicts and their effect on law, politics, and
society.
IV. SCENARIOS FOR SOVEREIGNTIES
So far, this paper has demonstrated that the growth of the knowledge
economy has provoked conflicts through its contradictory effects on coher-
ent groups. It somewhat casually describes these groups as an über class of
direct beneficiaries of the knowledge economy, an unter class that benefits
somewhat from migrating to urban concentrations to provide low-human-
capital services to these beneficiaries, and a dispossessed class of people
that lack the ability to benefit as workers within the knowledge economy
and suffer from the stagnation of the incumbent sectors that the knowledge
economy has displaced. Conflicts among these groups, as the previous sec-
tion of this paper shows, has generated considerable instability within states
and induced a rollback of international sovereignty along multiple
dimensions.
How will all this play out? I consider three possible outcomes—
doomsday, utopia, and muddling through. I sketch out each. Within each
scenario I take account of how the COVID-19 pandemic might affect the
result.
76. Cf. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 46(1), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331 (expression of consent that violates internal law not a ground for release from treaty obliga-
tion unless “that violation was manifest and concerned a rule of its internal law of fundamental
importance”). The United States did not join the Vienna Convention because, among other rea-
sons, the executive and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee could not agree what was “mani-
fest” about constitutional limits on U.S. acceptance of international agreements. Curtis A. Bradley,
Unratified Treaties, Domestic Politics, and the U.S. Constitution, 48 HARV. INT’L L. J. 307, 332
(2007).
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A. Doomsday
The remarkable success of the knowledge economy over the last fifty
years does not guarantee its continued survival. The world learned in
1914–18 that successful economic globalization is insufficient prophylaxis
against global cataclysm. That globalization now rests more on the produc-
tion of knowledge, rather than of physical commodities, does not change
the point: a successful world economy based on as well as promoting tech-
nological progress can still fall victim to those who lose out in the process.
Knowledge works only as long as it is stored and transmitted. Sufficiently
widespread turmoil in the world of things can undo that.
Doomsday could come by many paths. Escalating conflict among
states—fueled by municipal instability and increasingly desperate political
combat—might do terrible things, even if not resulting in outright war. A
freezing of international trade and investment, along the lines of what the
world experienced in 1930–34, would likely generate widespread unem-
ployment and misery, deepen political unrest, and fuel political extremism.
Liberal democratic politics based on delegation of authority and checks and
balances would disappear alongside the social trust that makes such politics
possible. Climate change caused by anthropogenic global warming might
put the nail in the coffin.
The present COVID-19 pandemic might push us further along this
path, although any firm conclusions are premature. At the time of this writ-
ing, we do not know how long or fatal the pandemic will be, much less its
immediate economic, social, and political consequences. A few thoughts
may be not crazy, however, even if offered with barrels of salt.
It seems likely that the burden of the pandemic will fall disproportion-
ately on the least privileged. Whether this is due to poverty itself, the
greater psychic costs of living as a marginalized minority, or a connection
between preexisting health conditions and these factors, is in some sense
beside the point. For any of these reasons, the disease may erode social trust
even more than we have seen to date, reinforcing the present economic and
political trends toward increased confrontation and disorder.
There is considerable evidence that catastrophe, if violent and wide-
spread enough, promotes economic and social equality. Indeed, some be-
lieve that nothing else does.77 One possibility, not necessarily a cheerful
one, is that the disease, added to the other forces already discussed, will
bring about enough collapse and disorder to disrupt the present hierarchies
that divide us from each other. The plutocracy may give way to a republic
of misery.
The downward spiral also may make it harder to address the chal-
lenges posed by climate change. Some have noted the short-term decline in
77. See, e.g., WALTER SCHEIDEL, THE GREAT LEVELER: VIOLENCE AND THE HISTORY OF INE-
QUALITY FROM THE STONE AGE TO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2018).
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\17-3\UST306.txt unknown Seq: 26 12-NOV-21 15:20
674 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 17:3
carbon emissions resulted from the shutdown of the economy and purport to
see a pathway toward a solution to global warming. But ending economic
activity as we have known it hardly seems a workable response to carbon in
the atmosphere. Most observers have counted on technological innovation,
either through changes in the way energy is produced and used or the devel-
opment of new means to extract and store atmosphere carbon, as a predicate
to any successful coping strategy. Shrinking social trust and growing eco-
nomic desperation, however, do not necessarily provide the best founda-
tions for technological leaps.78
Under doomsday conditions, then, the outlook for sovereignty, as for
everything else, is grim. Fear, uncertainty, and chaos will drive social, polit-
ical, and economic structures toward the minimal and local. We will see
many Hobbesian Leviathans and little cooperation among them. All will be
solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.
B. Utopia
Perhaps everyone will pull back from the brink, embrace the fruits of
technological advance, and devise ways to share those fruits more equitably
without turning off the engines of growth. People will recognize that both
the promotion of the knowledge economy and the sharing of its fruits re-
quire international cooperation and will come to trust the institutions that
give substance to that end.
As for COVID-19, perhaps scientists and public health experts will
organize international cooperation over the heads of domestic political ac-
tors. Not only will they spur need-based distribution of protective gear and
equipment, but, once available, of treatments and vaccines as well. Such a
strategy probably would be optimal for amelioration of the economic conse-
quences of the pandemic. If that cooperation were to be widely seen as
contributing significantly to an acceptable resolution of the crisis, then
some wind might go out of the sails of national populists. We will have to
wait and see.
The difficulty with the utopian scenario is its implicit assumption that
social capital and trust can accumulate as rapidly as it can be dispersed.79
Charismatic political leaders do claim to have this capacity and assert that
they can make their places and cultures great again. Some have enjoyed
short-term success based on such claims. The historical and comparative
evidence for quick turnarounds in declining societies, however, is not
reassuring.
78. The problem is complex. Existential threats can create a stronger incentive to adapt, but
not all adaptations succeed. At some point the severity of an existential threat can deter searches
for superior response. See Paul G. Mahoney & Chris W. Sanchirico, Competing Norms and Social
Evolution: Is the Fittest Norm Efficient? 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2027 (2001).
79. One might recall that Thomas More titled his work , or “no place.” How seri-
ously to take More’s implication, , or “good place”, is the heart of the matter.
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C. Muddle
Bracketed between an awful doomsday and an improbable utopia lies a
range of possibilities, defined mostly by what they don’t entail. The domes-
tic and international settlements reached in the wake of the collapse of the
Soviet Union seem unlikely to endure, but other arrangements remain possi-
ble. States may do more for the dispossessed without dispensing with the
fruits of the knowledge economy. Out of the present upheavals in domestic
politics might arise new arrangements, perhaps uninspiring but still
sustainable.
Several conjectures provide a basis for imagining what these arrange-
ments might entail. First, absent doomsday, the knowledge economy is not
likely to go away. Governments may tax or regulate it, but it provides too
many useful things and practices to too many people to make significant
contraction possible. Virtual connecting during the COVID-19 quarantine is
only the most recent manifestation of the knowledge economy’s indispensa-
ble products. Perhaps some steps will be taken to reduce the inequality that
this economy spurs, but, based on past practice, that seems unlikely.
Second, relations between knowledge workers and the dispossessed
will remain fraught and politically salient. There is no reason to believe that
the advances of the knowledge economy will not entail liquidating incum-
bents in a wide range of occupations. Self-driving vehicles promise to end
truck driving as a livelihood; breakthroughs in artificial intelligence may
put most radiologists out of work. There is no reason to believe that the
pace of creative destruction will diminish.
Fraught relations need not mean a battle to the death, however. Some
mixture of accommodation and exhaustion may ameliorate the conflicts be-
tween winners and losers in the knowledge economy. In some places social
solidarity based on a widely shared culture might do the job. In other, more
diverse societies it might take money. A general disillusionment with
promises of new golden ages, or of returns to supposed better pasts, might
set in.
A third conjecture is that all these changes will do greater damage to
international institutions than domestic ones, not that the latter will go un-
scathed. Achieving new domestic arrangements will take time and be
costly. It seems unlikely that states will wish to make complicated and con-
troversial international commitments at the same time as they thrash out
these local settlements.
There is a strand of liberal international relations theory that depicts
the institution-building in the wake of World War II as a top-down effort to
protect the shattered survivor states from the illiberal impulses of their local
politics.80 One might draw on this precedent to argue that, in the near fu-
80. See Andrew Moravcsik, The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation
in Postwar Europe, 54 INT’L ORG. 217 (2000).
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ture, states might submit to international discipline first, and then work out
their domestic conflicts. The analogy fails, however, for at least two rea-
sons. First, the post-war Europeans faced a threat in the form of Soviet
hegemony that concentrated minds on the need for collective action. Sec-
ond, and probably more importantly, the Europeans benefited from a hege-
mon in the form of the United States that offered both carrots (the Marshall
Plan) and sticks (covert action against Soviet political allies in western Eu-
rope) to induce submission to this order.81 Neither condition applies today.
What might this mean? Perhaps the European Union and the WTO
both will shed much of their institutional presence even as states continue to
maintain a kind of allegiance to the substantive principles of managed re-
duction of economic barriers. Formal international dispute settlement may
migrate away from established courts and toward ad hoc arbitration.82 Inter-
national organizations might shy away from lawmaking and instead serve
mostly as talking shops, somewhat on the model of the Organization of
Economic Cooperation and Development. International financial coopera-
tion faces an uncertain future, but the rise of muscular nationalism in this
sphere need not destroy the system.83
What about COVID-19? The most likely outcome, at least for the short
term, is greater inequality. Overcoming the pandemic will require, and
demonstrate the benefits of, even greater knowledge. Whether the break-
through comes through better detection and data-based social distancing
(think of smart phone apps), better treatment methods (not injecting bleach,
for example), or better prophylaxis (a vaccine or its equivalent), or all three,
knowledge workers will not just bask in the glory but also harvest the bene-
fits, material as well as spiritual. Add to this the great likelihood that the
disease will do the most harm to the most vulnerable. In the Spanish Influ-
enza, death and disruption fell disproportionately in the poorer portions of
the planet.84 We can only speculate why, but two plausible explanations are
(1) that the conditions of poverty and alienation (poor diet, untreated health
problems, addiction) increase susceptibility and (2) that societies tend to
channel effective but costly healthcare responses toward the privileged.
Both treatment and prophylaxis (vaccines) are likely to be distributed un-
equally, further exacerbating contemporary tensions. We have seen with the
81. See BENN STEIL, THE MARSHALL PLAN: DAWN OF THE COLD WAR 314–17 (2018) (con-
necting the two projects).
82. See Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, Judicial Independence in International Tribunals, 93
CAL. L. REV. 1 (2005).
83. See PIERRE-HUGUES VERDIER, GLOBAL BANKS ON TRIAL: U.S. PROSECUTIONS AND THE
REMAKING OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 179–80 (2020) (describing systemic benefits of national
hegemon’s regulatory interventions in international financial system).
84. See generally JOHN M. BARRY, THE GREAT INFLUENZA: THE STORY OF THE DEADLIEST
PANDEMIC IN HISTORY 363–64 (2004) (presenting evidence that the largest number of fatalities
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AIDS pandemic how access to extremely effective but somewhat costly
drug cocktails depends heavily on geography and social status. As to any
prospective COVID-19 vaccine, the states most fully engaged in research
and development have indicated a preference for first meeting the needs of
their own subjects before wider distribution.85
Taking all of this into account, one can imagine a world where knowl-
edge workers do better than ever, the unter class is restocked with new
members but not uplifted, and the people in the dispossessed class face even
greater stress and disappointment.86 A short-term result might be a tempo-
rary drop in support for national populism, especially in the rich world, due
to exhaustion more than reconciliation to the status quo. Just as possible,
however, is even greater radicalization of national populists and more of
their supporters showing up at the polls. Whether these divisions become a
sufficiently existential threat to those making up the über class to induce a
significant adjustment in their relations with everyone else, or instead pro-
duce mostly structural adjustments within that class (as we saw in the So-
viet Union and see in China) remains the great imponderable of the age.
On the whole, the crisis to date has undermined rather than bolstered
international governance. The most prominent technocratic international
agency, the World Health Organization, has come under fire for its sup-
posed slow response to the crisis and feckless loyalty to China. Its issuance
of confusing and contradictory guidance hasn’t helped its case. Cooperation
over sharing medical supplies, such as protective gear and hospital equip-
ment, largely has broken down, notwithstanding free-trade rules.87 Borders
have closed around the world, including within Europe’s Schengen Zone.
The information needed to be shared to combat the virus has been closely
held for parochial reasons. At first blush and subject to learning by doing,
the essentially global nature of the threat appears to have triggered more
neighbor-beggaring than international cooperation.
Further shifts away from international sovereignty, however, do not
mean the end of international cooperation or even the death of international
law. In the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic, states conceivably might
react to the current retrenchment by identifying new areas where greater
85. E.g., Carolyn Y. Johnson & Eva Dou, The Global Race for a Coronavirus Vaccine Could
Lead to This Generation’s Sputnik Moment, WASH. POST (June 3, 2020), https://www.washington
post.com/health/2020/06/03/coronavirus-vaccine-global-race (describing nationalist moves by
United States, China, and United Kingdom).
86. See Jack L. Goldsmith & Andrew Keane Woods, Internet Speech Will Never Go Back to
Normal, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 25, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/04/what-
covid-revealed-about-internet/610549 (pandemic has accelerated the acquisition of data resources
by data-aggregating firms); Clara Hendrickson & Mark Muro, The Avenue—Will COVID-19
Rebalance America’s Uneven Economic Geography? Don’t Bet On It., BROOKINGS (Apr. 13,
2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/the-avenue/2020/04/13/will-covid-19-rearrange-americas-
uneven-economic-geography-dont-bet-on-it.
87. See supra note 55. R
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transparency and accountability to other states might generate greater bene-
fits for broad domestic politic interests. What we might expect is more
piecemeal steps undertaken with greater caution, compared to where we
were at the end of the twentieth century.
V. CONCLUSION
The general point is that the present crisis over sovereignty reflects
deep economic trends that have reshaped the world economy, generated
enormous wealth, raised hundreds of millions out of extreme poverty, but
also reinforced inequality and prompted a widespread global backlash. The
pandemic has made things worse. There is no good reason to believe that
these clashes and the resulting instability will go away any time soon.
All these developments are likely to reduce the domain of international
sovereignty in the near and mid-term without necessarily strengthening the
authority of most nation-states. Even if we succeed in muddling through,
our experience is likely to make us see the allocation of sovereignty in the
emerging new world as more clearly contestable and contingent, rather than
baked into historically inevitable and universally desirable governance
structures. We may create new illusions in the days to come, but the inevita-
bility of liberal democratic cosmopolitanism is not likely to be among them.
